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As almost any first year law student can tell you, the ability of a
plaintiff to force a defendant to come to court and defend, or face
a valid default judgment, is a function of several factors. Primarily,
however, the plaintiff must give proper notice to the defendant
(and opportunity to defend) and the court must have territorial
authority over the defendant. ' The latter factor is itself dependent
on a legislative grant of authority to assert power over the defend-
ant, which must be within the limits set by the due process clauses
of the Constitution.2 These grants of authority-the so-called long-
arm statutes-are the subject of this article.
Every state has some kind of long-arm statute.' These statutes
vary from specific delineations of authority4 to very general grants
of authority.5 Long-arm statutes are limited in their reach by the
Constitution; however, there is no requirement that their reach be
as long as the Constitution's grasp.6 And in some cases the statutes
* Professor of Law, Whittier College School of Law. A.B. 1975, Princeton University;
J.D. 1978, New York University School of Law.
1. Or, to put it another way, the defendant must be amenable to service of process.
2. I say "clauses" because the due process clauses of both the fifth and fourteenth
amendments affect jurisdiction.
3. A compendium can be found in the Appendix to CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL Ac-
TIONS A-32 to A-101 (1983 and 1986 Supp.) [hereinafter "Casad"].
4. E.g., OR. R. Civ. PROC. 4 (1987).
5. California's statute is the most notable of these, permitting jurisdiction "on any
basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL. Clv.
PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
6. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952).
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do not extend to the limits of Constitutional authority.' More
often, however, the statutes, either expressly or by judicial inter-
pretation, "go to the limits of due process." Therein lies the issue
for this article-what precisely do the states mean when they say
that their statutes go to the limits of due process?
II. THE PROBLEM
The impetus for this investigation was my previous examination
of personal jurisdiction in federal courts.' As noted there, under
Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts
can assert jurisdiction over non-resident defendants using either of
two grants of authority.9 First, there may be a federal long-arm
statute. Unfortunately, no general federal statute exists. In a rela-
tively few instances, Congress has given long-arm authority for
specific claims. 10 In the absence of a federal statute, federal courts
are relegated to the second line of authority, the long arm-statutes
of the state in which the district court sits.1" When using state
statutes, federal courts are bound to observe the limits placed on
the statutes by the states. 2 But, as I have argued elsewhere, when
a state statute "goes to the limits of due process" the limits of the
statute are set by federal constitutional law, not state law.'3 If that
7. See, e.g., Galgay v. Bulletin Co., Inc., 504 F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1974) (discuss-
ing New York law); Lavie v. Marketscope Research Co., Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 373, 374, 336
N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (dicta); Mallard v. Aluminum Co. of Canada, Ltd., 634 F.2d
236, 241 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981) (Florida law).
8. Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The Federal Interest in Personal Jurisdiction,
56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1987) (hereinafter Welkowitz].
9. Rule 4(e) provides, in relevant part:
Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is held
provides (1) for service of a summons. . . upon a party not an inhabitant of or found
within the state, . . . service may . . . be made under the circumstances and in the
manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
10. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982) (Securities Exchange Act); 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (inter-
pleader); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(e) (Supp. 1986) (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1982) (Employee Retirement Security
Act); 11 U.S.C. Rule 7004(d) (1982) (bankruptcy).
11. Because each state has at least one judicial district, this does not cause a major
dilemma in determining applicable law. But there is no requirement that a judicial district
be wholly within one state. It would be interesting to see what Congress would have done if
multistate districts existed. Perhaps this would have forced Congress or the Supreme Court
(acting pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (Supp. 1989)) to deal with
this problem.
12. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987). See Welkowitz,
supra note 8 at 11-17.
13. See Welkowitz, supra note 8, at 17-18.
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is correct, then the limits set by the applicable federal law (i.e., the
fifth amendment) may be different for a federal court than for a
state court." This may mean that a federal court could assert ju-
risdiction over a defendant when a state court could not do so.
However, the process of drawing the line between state and fed-
eral law in this area is not as simple as one might think. For exam-
ple, some state statutes expressly incorporate the due process test
of "minimum contacts with the state" in their statutes as the lim-
iting feature of the statute.15 Has the legislature incorporated
"minimum contacts with the state" literally into the statute, or are
they merely using statutory language to that effect as a convenient
way of recognizing the Constitutional limits on state law?"6 In
other states whose statutes more specifically set forth the required
jurisdictional contacts, state courts have said that these go to the
limits of due process.1 7 However, it is appropriate to ask just what
state courts mean when they say that their statutes reach the lim-
its of due process. Do they mean that the statutes reach the limits
only as presently construed, or are the statutes intended to reach
any defendant in any situation permitted by due process, however
defined? This is particularly pertinent in states whose statutes
contain specific categories. Do these statutes incorporate a particu-
lar due process test as a matter of state statutory law or does the
statute merely reflect a state's perception of the due process stan-
dard, rather than incorporating it as state law? If the former, that
might be a limit on federal court authority.
The point can be restated this way. Let us suppose that the Su-
preme Court discards the minimum contacts test for a less strin-
gent standard (either one of pure fairness under the circum-
stances'" or one of minimum contacts with the United States 9 ). In
those states where the long-arm statute now purports to go to the
limits of due process, would it take a legislative act to conform the
statute to the new due process standard? If not, then one could
14. See Welkowitz, supra note 8, at 22-35.
15. E.g., ALA. R. Civ. PROC. 4.2 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (Supp. 1989).
16. See Welkowitz, supra note 8, at 16-17.
17. E.g., Jonz v. Garrett/AiResearch Corp., 490 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Alaska 1971); Kil-
crease v. Butler, 739 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Ark. 1987); LaNuova D & B, S.p.A. v. Bowe Co., 513
A.2d 764, 768 (Del. 1986); Cowan v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, Ltd. , 608 P.2d 394, 399 (Haw.
1980).
18. Justice Brennan seems to be moving in this direction. See, e.g., World-Wide Volk-
swagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299-301 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. See, e.g., Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1530 (9th Cir. 1989); Meadows v.
Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 486 (1987).
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argue reasonably that the limits on the statutes are not really those
of the state legislature but the Constitution. In that case, a federal
court might conclude that a different constitutional standard ap-
plies to the exercise of jurisdiction by a federal court and act ac-
cordingly. On the other hand, if it would require an amendment to
the statute to conform to a new standard, a federal court might
reason that the "minimum contacts with the state" limitation is a
function of state law and thus would be bound to follow it.
Although the federal court issue prompted this discussion, it is
submitted that the investigation has other rewards. It is useful to
collect in one place the diversity of responses of the states to the
same set of problems. It is also interesting to see how different
courts react to the same statutory language. Moreover, along the
way I have tried to point out some interesting quirks in some stat-
utes that are of both theoretical and practical interest. Finally it is
hoped that treating this issue with regard to long-arm statutes in
all states will aid state courts and legislatures in the consideration
of their own statutes.
III. TYPES OF LONG-ARM STATUTES
Long-arm statutes in one form or another have been around for
many years. Among the earliest were those permitting jurisdiction
over non-resident motorists who were involved in auto accidents
while driving in the forum state.20 As the permissible bases for ju-
risdiction expanded, so did the numbers of statutes permitting ju-
risdiction. Indeed, even today states may have numerous jurisdic-
tional statutes dealing with narrowly defined situations.2" However,
our concern here is primarily with the generalized long-arm statute
that permits jurisdiction under a range of circumstances that fit
the broad contours of the statute. Some states have more than one
general long-arm statute; this usually occurs when a state has one
statute applying to non-resident individuals and another to foreign
corporations.22 However, the existence of such multiple statutes
does not lead to different analyses because the categories in each
statute tend to be the same.
20. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Note, Developments in the Law:
State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 999 (1960).
21. South Dakota, for example, has several. See statutes cited in Larson, In Personam
Jurisdiction and the South Dakota Jurisdictional Statutes: A Basic Review and Update,
31 S.D.L. REV. 116, 140 (1985).
22. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411 (1987) (service on foreign corporations); id. at
§ 52-59b (foreign partnerships and nonresidents); Vermont statutes cited infra in note 37.
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These general long-arm statutes come in three basic varieties,
which I call Types 1, 2 and 3. What I call Type 1 statutes are the
simplest. They state, in one form or another, that the statute al-
lows the assertion of jurisdiction to the limits permitted by the
Constitution.2" What I call Type 2 statutes are the archetypical
long-arm statutes. They list specific acts or categories of acts that
are the basis of jurisdiction. This is by far the most common type
of statute. These statutes derive largely from two sources. First
was the Illinois statute, passed in 1955. That statute was copied by
many states. 24 The second influence was the Uniform Interstate
and International Procedure Act, which was patterned after the Il-
linois statute but which differs in some important details.2"
These two types would seem to cover the field, but they do not.
Surprisingly, there is a third type of statute-a combination of the
first two. These statutes contain the same categories as Type 2
statutes plus a clause or subsection that looks like a Type 1
statute.26
Despite this variety, the courts of most states have come to the
same conclusion about their statutes-that they go to the limits of
due process. However, an examination of the statutes and the cases
indicates that not all states agree on what that means. Let us turn
to the categories one by one to analyze this problem.
A. Type 1 Statutes
Six states-California, Oklahoma, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
Vermont and Wyoming-have this kind of statute. California,
Oklahoma and Wyoming have substantially identical statutes. All
allow jurisdiction "on any basis consistent with the Constitution of
this state and the Constitution of the United States. 2 7 New
23. The model is the California statute. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
24. See, e.g., Casad, supra note 3, 4.01.
25. Section 1.03 of the Act, Unif. Interstate and Int'. Procedure Act § 1.03, 13 U.L.A.
361 (1986). Many states also incorporate a portion of § 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act into
their long-arm statutes. Unif. Parentage Act § 8, 9B U.L.A. 309 (1987). This section deals
with jurisdiction over certain paternity claims.
26. The latest such statute is Louisiana's. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201(B) (West
Supp. 1989). However, a number of other statutes have them, including Alabama, Iowa,
Maine, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Oregon and Utah. See statutes cited infra
note 40.
27. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2004 (West Supp. 1988-1989). Until 1987, Oklahoma
had a Type 3 statute. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(7) (West 1980). California's statute




Jersey's statute is essentially the same, allowing jurisdiction in any
case "consistent with due process of law."2 By their language
these statutes allow their courts to exercise the maximum reach of
long-arm jurisdiction, no matter what constitutional test for due
process is used.2 9 There is nothing on the faces of the statutes lim-
iting them to a particular due process test. In fact, the statutes
seem deliberately designed to avoid such limitations. It is reasona-
ble to assume that the state legislatures that enacted them did not
want the statutes tied rigidly to the due process model then in
vogue. The legislatures would be mindful of the many changes that
have occurred in jurisdictional decisions over the years and seem to
have chosen to, so to speak, go with the flow. The best interpreta-
tion of such statutes is that the forum states want to assert author-
ity under all possible conditions, regardless of whether the consti-
tutional test used is "minimum contacts with the state" or some
other test that the Supreme Court uses. A federal court using these
statutes ought to be able to use a fifth amendment jurisdictional
test, even if it differs from the fourteenth amendment standard.3
The Rhode Island statute is a little different. Any person having
''minimum contacts with the state" is subject to its reach "in every
case not contrary to the provisions of the constitution or laws of
the United States."31 For most purposes, this will operate the same
way as the California, New Jersey and Wyoming statutes. But
what if minimum contacts were no longer the due process test?
Would this statute simply use the new test? And is it the intent of
the legislature that contacts "with the state" [of Rhode Island] are
essential, or was that an unfortunate shorthand for the type of
statute found in California?
These questions are not easily answered. Legislative history on
28. N.J. CIv. PRAC. R. 4:4-4(i) (West 1989).
29. There do not appear to be any different restrictions placed by state constitutions
than those placed by the federal one. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assoc., Ltd.,
557 F.2d 1280, 1286 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) (California); see Nutri-West v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693,
694-95 (Wyo. 1988) (Defendant claimed jurisdiction violated federal and state constitutions;
court looked only to a federal constitutional test). Whether this would be true if federal
courts applied a radically different test under the fifth amendment than state courts use
under the fourteenth amendment is unclear. However, the state courts probably would not
be offended because the seeming intrusion on a defendant's right would be by a federal
court, not a state court. Indeed, the state court might find that its statute was not intended
to limit federal courts at all.
30. Cf. Nutri-West v. Gibson, 764 P.2d at 695 (Wyo. 1988) (finding that due process
analysis does not require use of "minimum contacts" test where defendant is present in the
state when served).
31. R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-5-33 (1985).
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the statute is scarce.32 At the time of its enactment, it is doubtful
that the Rhode Island legislature gave any thought to these mat-
ters. Minimum contacts was (and for that matter still is) the due
process test, and had been for over a decade. The effect of the stat-
ute on federal courts probably was of little concern to these legisla-
tors. Indeed, at that time, federal venue restrictions made the
problem of long-arm jurisdiction in federal courts unusual outside
of diversity cases." And the federal courts were just at the point of
deciding that diversity cases were bound on this point by state law,
which seemed at least outwardly logical.3 4
There is some evidence of legislative intent, however. In Conn v.
ITT Aetna Finance Co.,3 5 the Rhode Island Supreme Court cited a
report of the Judicial Council to the legislature proposing the pas-
sage of the long-arm statute. In that report, the Judicial Council
urged the legislature to enact a statute broad enough "to make full
use of the jurisdiction permitted by these recent decisions [Inter-
national Shoe and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.]
and to direct that the Rhode Island Courts hold non-residents
amendable to suit in every case except those where the due process
of the Federal constitution interferes."3 6 Assuming that this report
accurately reflects the legislature's intent, the language used in the
statute appears to be just a poor way of expressing the Judicial
Council's proposal. It is likely that the Rhode Island legislature
thought it was doing what California did some years
later-extending its statute as far as possible. If asked, one would
expect that the legislators would not have objected to their statute
being used to assert jurisdiction over a defendant who lacked "con-
tact" if it was otherwise fair and reasonable to assert authority.
The Vermont statute is also different in form from the Califor-
nia model. It permits litigants to serve process on "[a] person
whose contact or activity in this state . . . is sufficient to support a
32. In preparing this article I contacted the Rhode Island state library and was in-
formed that documents relating to this statute, passed some 30 years ago, no longer exist.
Attempts to contact a co-sponsor of the bill in the Rhode Island Legislature have been
unavailing.
33. Until 1966, the general federal venue statute (28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1963)) only per-
mitted venue in federal question cases where all of the defendants resided. In diversity
cases, the district where all plaintiffs resided was also proper. In 1966 Congress amended the
statute to permit venue where the claim arose.
34. But see Welkowitz, supra note 8, at 19-21.
35. 105 R.I. 397, 252 A.2d 184 (1969).
36. 252 A.2d at 186 n.3. See Riverhouse Publishing Co. v. Porter, 287 F. Supp. 1, 6
(D.R.I. 1968).
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personal judgment against him."3 7 Curiously, there is no true ame-
nability standard set out in the law.3 8 But it is difficult to fathom
any other explanation for this statute than that the legislature be-
lieved its courts should have the maximum allowable jurisdictional
reach. 9
Type 1 statutes do not purport to limit the reach of any courts,
state or federal. A federal court using such a statute should feel
free to use the appropriate federal constitutional test with no
worry about any state statutory restrictions.
B. Type 3 Statutes
Surprisingly (at least to this writer), nine states have this type of
long-arm statute.40 One would think that the legislatures simply
37. VT. R. Civ. PRoc. 4. Another statute is found at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 913 (West
1973). It is essentially identical. There is also a statute pertaining to foreign corporations,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (West 1973), again with the same wording.
38. One would have to look to VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 913 (1973) for any stab at
amenability. Unfortunately, it contains the same vague language as the rule and therefore is
not very helpful.
39. The Reporter's Notes to the 1979 amendment of the Rule support this belief. They
state that the intent of the rule as amended was to conform to Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977).
40. ALA R. Civ. PROc. 4.2(a) (1984); IowA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (West 1980) and IowA
RULES OF COURT 56.2 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. § 13:3201(B) (1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 704-A (1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536 (1985); OR. R. CIv. PRoc. 4 (1987); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5322 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-7-2; TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214 (1980);
see UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-22. On the face of its laws, Texas would be classified as a Type
3 or Type 1 state. It has four major rules or statutes dealing with long-arm jurisdiction. It
has a general Type 2 statute, TEX. REV. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042 (Vernon 1986) and
two domestic relations long-arm statutes, TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 3.26 and 11.051 (Vernon 1986).
In addition, effective in 1976, the Texas Supreme Court amended TEx. R. Civ. P. 108, adding
a sentence stating that someone served under the rule "may be required to appear and
answer under the Constitution of the United States in an action . . . in personam." This
looks like a Type 3 clause and some Texas case law supports this conclusion. E.g., Para-
mount Pipe & Supply Co., Inc. v. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491, 495 (Tex. 1988); Fox v. Fox, 559
S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). However, the Fifth Circuit has held that Rule 108 is
not a separate long-arm statute, thus restricting its use by federal litigants. Wyatt v.
Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 285 (5th Cir. 1982) (questioning whether the Texas Supreme Court
would be acting within its powers to add an amenability provision to Rule 108). Research on
LEXIS and Westlaw indicates that Rule 108 is rarely invoked by litigants as a separate
source of amenability, possibly because of uncertainty over its status. Commentators, in-
cluding drafters of the domestic relations long-arm law, are uncertain about the authority of
the Rule. E.g., Weintraub, Texas Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Family Law Cases, 32 Sw. L.J.
965, 974 (1978) (arguing that the rule is a separate long-arm statute); Carlson, General Ju-
risdiction and the Exercise of In Personam Jurisdiction Under the Texas Long-Arm Stat-
ute, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 307, 328-330 (1986) (same); Sampson, Jurisdiction in Divorce and
Conservatorship Suits, 8 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 159, 216-18 (1976) (indicating uncertainty
about the issue). Because of this uncertainty and the treatment Rule 108 has received by
cases I have placed Texas in the Type 2 category. However, if the recent Texas Supreme
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would have repealed the old statutes and replaced them with the
California or Rhode Island style statute that is now appended to
the long-arm statute.
Discerning why these states acted this way is difficult. Again,
legislative history is spotty. In Tennessee, for example, it consists
of a short statement of the legislative sponsor to the effect that the
legislators want the courts to have expanded jurisdiction."' This is
not very enlightening. However, it does appear that prior to the
amendment, Tennessee courts interpreted the statute in a way
that may have fallen short of due process.4 2 In Nebraska, the au-
thor of the long-arm statute notes the oddity but asserts that it
was done deliberately to emphasize the legislature's intent to
broaden the statute.
43
In Alabama, the change was accomplished through a committee
revising the state's rules of civil procedure. With some reserva-
tions,4 4 the commission decided that it merely was codifying estab-
lished Alabama law.4 5 However, its commentary noted that the is-
sue was not entirely free from doubt and that the new catchall
clause was intended to dispel any doubts on the subject.4 More-
over, the statute was worded in such a way to make clear that the
specific categories that remained were not a limitation on the
catchall clause. Why were the categories kept? Apparently to guide
the courts in areas that had already been found to satisfy due
process.47
In Oregon, courts have provided this explanation for the exis-
tence of the odd hybrid statute:
Subsections B. through K. of Rule 4 may appear to be redundant in view of
court case supporting the use of Rule 108 as a separate form of authority catches on, Texas
would become a Type 3 state.
41. The Tennessee statute is TENN. CODE. ANN. § 20-2-214(6) (1980). The legislative
history is cited in Gullett v. Qantas Airways Ltd., 417 F. Supp. 490, 493 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).
42. See Gullett v. Qantas Airways, Ltd., 417 F. Supp. at 493, citing Southern Machine
Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 377 (6th Cir. 1968). See also Note, Develop-
ments in Civil Procedure, 53 TENN. L. REV. 291, 294-95 (1985).
43. Kirst, Nebraska's Modern Service of Process Statute, 63 NEB. L. REV. 1, 20-21
(1983). In a letter to me Professor Kirst noted his authorship of the statute and reiterated
that he wanted to insure that courts could not interpret the catchall amendment as over-
turning any basis of jurisdiction already found to exist under the previous version of the
statute. Letter from Professor Roger W. Kirst to David Welkowitz (February 16, 1989). I am
grateful to Professor Kirst for his kind response to my inquiry on this matter.






the subsection L. catchall provision, but they are not superfluous. Based as
they are on facts which the United States Supreme Court has held to be
adequate bases for jurisdiction, these more specific provisions serve to nar-
row the inquiry so that if a case falls within one of them, there is no need to
litigate more involved issues of due process .... Once a plaintiff alleges
facts bringing his or her case within a specific provision, that ordinarily will
be the end of the matter. On the other hand, if resort to ORCP 4L. is neces-
sary, then the limits of due process must be explored. (Footnote omitted) 8
However, this justification does not apply easily to all Type 3 stat-
utes. Oregon's statute contains eleven specific categories plus the
catchall. They are far more specific than the "transacting busi-
ness" or "tortious act" sections of a typical statute.49 The Alabama
and Nebraska rationales appear to be more reasonable explana-
tions for most Type 3 statutes. They eliminate any uncertainty
about the reach of the statutes.
From the standpoint of federal court usage, the most interesting
of these statutes is the one in South Dakota.50 The "catchall"
clause itself is not unusual. What is unusual is the clause right
before it, which has federal implications. That section specifically
allows personal jurisdiction over persons accused of violating state
or federal antitrust laws.5 1 This is remarkable because subject mat-
ter jurisdiction in federal antitrust matters is exclusively federal.2
Moreover, for corporate defendants, there is nationwide service of
process in such cases.53 Thus, the long-arm statute only applies to
individuals. For a state legislature to fill a gap that will apply only
to federal courts is strange indeed. 5 However, this idiosyncracy
should not affect the interpretation of the statute. The catchall
clause was passed in a separate statute, enacted after the specific
clauses had been enacted.
One interesting twist is found in Iowa. Iowa has a Type 2 statute
48. State ex rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale, 294 Or. 381, 384, 657 P.2d 211,
211 (1982), quoted in Regal Mgf. Co. v. Louisiana Glass, Inc., 83 Or. App. 463, 731 P.2d
1066, 1067 (1987).
49. They included sections relating to violations of Oregon securities law (Rule 4J),
being an officer or director of an Oregon corporation (Rule 4G), performing services for
plaintiff within Oregon at the specific request of a defendant (Rule 4E(2), etc.
50. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-7-2 (1984).
51. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-7-2(13) (1984).
52. See, e.g., Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist. of Peoria, 583 F.2d 378, 379
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982). See, e.g., Catrone v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 647 F.
Supp. 850, 856 (D. Mass. 1986).
54. Legislative history, to the extent available, is unrevealing. Most likely, it was an
attempt to allow jurisdiction over non-resident state antitrust violators, and the legislators
added federal claims for completeness without considering the implications of their actions.
Vol. 28:233
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covering tortious acts of foreign corporations.5 In addition, Rule
56.2 of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure contains a Type 1
clause."' In Cross v. Lightolier, Inc.57 the plaintiff served defendant
under the statute, not the rule. Unfortunately for plaintiff, the
statute turned out to be more restrictive and the court refused to
bail out plaintiff by looking to the rule as a possible basis of
jurisdiction."
In Tennessee, the legislature has acted in a strange way that
gives one pause as to the proper interpretation of its statute. A
"catchall" clause was added to the Tennessee long-arm statute in
1972. 5" Yet in 1975 the legislature amended the statute to add an-
other basis of jurisdiction-over a nonresident parent who had
lived in Tennessee while married and then failed to pay child sup-
port.6 0 In fact, this clause was further amended in 1978 to add fail-
ure to pay alimony to the jurisdictional bases.6' Since Tennessee
has a California-style catchall clause the additional clause makes
little sense. When the 1975 amendment was passed, one of its
sponsors indicated that "most judges" in the state had not been
willing to exercise jurisdiction in cases of non-resident parents be-
ing sued for support.6 2 If true,6 3 it is rather puzzling in light of the
all encompassing catchall clause. Furthermore, there was consider-
able controversy over adding "alimony" to the list. It was defeated
in the Tennessee House of Representatives in the 1975 amend-
ments6' and was not universally supported in 1978.65 One might
55. IowA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 1989).
56. The rule allows assertion of jurisdiction over anyone with "the necessary minimum
contact with the state of Iowa. . . in every case not contrary to the provisions of the consti-
tution of the United States." IOWA RULES OF COURT 56.2 (1980).
57. 395 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1986).
58. 395 N.W.2d at 847-48.
59. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214(6) (1980).
60. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 20-2-214(7) (1980).
61. Id.
62. This reference is found in the tapes of the legislative sessions during which the
amendment was debated. See Discussion by Sen. White of amendments to HB 103 (substi-
tuted for SB 210), April 30, 1975 (tape # S-85). The senator also noted that "some author-
ity" supported using the long-arm statute as it existed but did not specify that authority.
Id.
63. No published case denying jurisdiction in these instances can be found. Recent
cases tend to cite the "catch-all" clause for jurisdictional authority. See cases cited in note
66 infra.
64. Tapes of Tennessee House of Representatives sessions on HB 103, March 24, 1975
(tape # H-42).
65. The opposing legislators did not cite the existence of the catch-all clause. They
opposed allowing their courts to have this jurisdiction, even though the catch-all clause
seems to grant it in any case. Indeed, one senator indicated that he believed the Tennessee
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argue that the legislature has implicitly limited the catchall clause,
at least in domestic relations cases. But cases in the Tennessee
courts after 1978 have read the statute expansively.6
Notwithstanding the oddity of a hybrid statute containing spe-
cific categories and a catchall clause, the analysis of Type 3 stat-
utes leads to results similar to Type 1 statutes. Those that use the
California-style language 7 should permit the use of whatever due
process standard is appropriate under the circumstances (i.e. fifth
or fourteenth amendment).6 s
The courts of these states bear this out. Following passage of the
"catchall" amendments, the courts tend to regard their statutes
much like Type 1 statutes.6 9 The more specific clauses are still
used by litigants (possibly by lawyers unaccustomed to the new
statutes). Moreover, they still are discussed by the courts, often
without any discussion of the catchall clauses. 70 But they seem to
be regarded as simply examples of conduct that can trigger juris-
diction and not as limitations on the statute.7'
There is one important difference between Type 3 and Type 1
statutes that conceivably could affect the outcome of some cases.
courts could only award alimony where personal service had been made within the state of
Tennessee. See, e.g., Comments of Sen. Henry, Tapes of Senate sessions on SB 1684, Febru-
ary 9, 1978 (tape # S-32).
66. E.g., Masada Inv. Corp. v. Allen, 697 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tenn. 1985); Miller v.
Miller, No. 86-248 II, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. App. 1987); Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 645
S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tenn. App. 1981); see Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 756
S.W.2d 678, 684-85 (Tenn. 1988) (using the catchall to overrule prior cases that used a dif-
ferent statute to limit jurisdiction).
67. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 13:3201(B) (West. Supp. 1989).
68. Only three of the Type 3 states do not have California-style catchall clauses. In
those states - Pennsylvania, Iowa and Maine - there is some reference to minimum con-
tacts with the state or the fourteenth amendment in the statutes. The effect of the Maine
statute is discussed infra. In Iowa and Pennsylvania there is no legislative history pointing
one way or another as to the legislature's intent with respect to that language. Most likely,
the situation in these states was the same as that in Rhode Island. The due process standard
used when the statutes were passed was "minimum contacts with the state" for virtually
any purpose about which the state would care. It is unlikely that state legislatures would
analyze the situation carefully enough to realize that it might be possible for a federal court
using the state statute to apply a different constitutional standard than that applied by the
state courts. It is particularly unlikely to have been discussed when in fact federal courts
generally are using the same constitutional standard as the state courts when using the state
statute. See Welkowitz, supra note 8, at 11-18.
69. See e.g., Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 834 F.2d 510, 514 (5th Cir.
1987) (Louisiana); Masada Inv. Corp. v. Allen, 697 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tenn. 1985).
70. E.g., Holden v. Holden, 374 Pa. Super. 184, 542 A.2d 557 (1988) (using the "tor-
tious act" section of the statute); Barnhardt v. Madvig, 526 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. 1975); Jay
Pontiac, Inc. v. Whigham, 485 So.2d 1171, 1174 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).
71. See cases cited in note 70, supra.
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Some of the Type 3 statutes have "specific jurisdiction" language
incorporated in them. In other words, a section of the long-arm
statute states that the use of this statute is limited to claims that
arise out of the contacts forming the basis of jurisdiction (i.e. spe-
cific jurisdiction). 2 In effect, the statute contemplates assertion of
jurisdiction whenever warranted by due process as long as the ju-
risdictional basis (which, under the present due process test,
means the contacts) is related to the claim against the defendant.
Type 1 statutes typically contain no such restriction. Thus, it
would be possible for a Type 1 statute to include a form of general
jurisdiction not provided for by a Type 3 statute.73 Most states
have other statutes permitting general jurisdiction as well. 4 But,
although the applicable standards under those statutes may reach
current due process limits75 it is not clear what restrictions, if any,
states might place on general jurisdiction if it were divorced from
the contacts test. On the other hand, if the jurisdictional test is
expanded, in most cases the jurisdictional nexus would have some
relationship to the claim. For example, if a federal court used a
test of "minimum contacts with the United States" for certain de-
fendants, the contacts with the United States normally would in-
clude those on which the claim was based. 6 It would be an unusual
case where a federal court would attempt to assert jurisdiction
without any connection between the claim and this country. None-
theless, if the fifth amendment test is minimum contacts with the
United States, a requirement that the contacts be related to the
claim could be a problem in certain cases. One possible example
would be civil claims for injury or wrongful death by terrorists act-
ing outside the country. 77 Another might be stock frauds commit-
72. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704-A(2) (1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-7-2
(1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214 (1980). See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322(b) (1981) (by
implication, since it purports to supplement a general jurisdiction statute).
73. Under current due process tests it is said that specific jurisdiction requires fewer
contacts than general jurisdiction. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limi-
tations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77, 82 (1980).
74. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301(a) (1981); see also N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R.
§ 301 (McKinney 1978).
75. As defined in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
76. It is clear that not all of the statutorily required contacts need be related to the
claim. Several states have a subsection in their statutes allowing jurisdiction where defend-
ant commits a tortious act outside the state and he or she derives revenue from business
activity within the state. See Unif. Interstate and International Procedure Act § 1.03(a)(4),
13 U.L.A. 361 (1986). Under those statutes, it is not necessary that the business activity be
related to the claim, as long as the claim arises from the tort. See Comment to Unif. Inter-
state and International Procedure Act § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. at 363.
77. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (Supp. 1987); id. § 1203 (both are criminal statutes relating to
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ted by foreigners against Americans residing abroad.78 However, if
the jurisdictional test used measures the sufficiency of the interest
of the government in bringing the defendant to this court,7 9 then
the connection between the claim and the jurisdictional acts is
made.8 0
Not surprisingly, federal courts in Type 3 states have not used
fifth amendment standards even when they recognize the issue.
For example, consider two recent admiralty cases decided in the
federal courts of Maine. Maine has a Type 3 statute with a Califor-
nia style catchall clause." However, in these two cases, the courts
held that, despite the fact that the fifth amendment might permit
jurisdiction, the court was limited by the reach of the Maine stat-
ute to the fourteenth amendment standard.2 As discussed earlier,
it is the author's position that where the only restraints on juris-
diction are those of the Constitution, it is the fifth, not the four-
teenth amendment that applies.8 3 Admittedly, the Maine statute
contains prefatory language to the effect that the statute is to be
used to go to the limits of the fourteenth amendment. ' But the
federal courts discussing this issue do not seem to have relied on
this language. Thus they did not consider whether the language
actually was intended as a limitation on the statute. Even if they
had considered this language, it should not have led ineluctably to
prosecution of terrorists injuring American nationals outside this country). For a discussion
of criminal jurisdiction over terrorists acting abroad, see generally U.S. v. Yunis, 681 F.
Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988).
78. In the latter case, the nationwide service provisions of the securities laws provide a
federal basis for jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982). This avoids the problem of using a
state long-arm statute.
79. See Welkowitz, supra note 8, at 25-27.
80. It might be possible to argue that a terrorist attack aimed at Americans is "di-
rected at" the United States, within the meaning of Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102 (1987). A similar argument could be made for stock frauds if the target is
American citizens living in the United States.
81. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704-A (1980).
82. Sparkowich v. American Steamship Owner's Mut. Protection & Indem. Assn., 687
F. Supp. 695, 698 (D. Me. 1988); Merrill v. Zapata Gulf Marine Corp., 667 F. Supp. 37, 39-40
(D. Me. 1987).
83. Welkowitz, supra note 8, at 11-21. Interestingly, the Maine Supreme Court has
refused a federal court's request to determine the length of the Maine long-arm statute on
the grounds that this was purely a matter of federal constitutional law. Ouellette v. Sturm,
Ruger & Co., Inc., 466 A.2d 478, 480-81 (Me. 1983). Thus, the Maine court does not seem to
believe that the limits on its statute are legislatively imposed.
84. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704-A (1980) provides, in part: "This section . . .
shall be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent
permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution, 14th amendment."
(Emphasis added)
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a fourteenth amendment standard. The statute contains other in-
troductory language apparently limiting its use to resident plain-
tiffs. However, the Maine courts have dismissed that language as
prefatory and not controlling.8 5 The fourteenth amendment lan-
guage most likely was not intended to limit the reach of the stat-
ute. Like the language used in the Rhode Island statute, it appears
to be a recognition of what the legislature considered the outer
ceiling on the statute-namely, applicable federal law. To a state
court, the applicable federal law is the fourteenth amendment. If
the legislators considered its effect on federal courts at all, they
would have found that most federal cases use the "minimum con-
tacts with the state" standard even in federal question cases. It is
unlikely that many legislators would have felt the need to probe
further.
C. Type 2 Statutes
The most interesting and difficult group to analyze is the Type 2
statutes. These are the statutes that we learned about in law
school-briefly, in most cases. They are "specific act" statutes.
That is, they list a series of categories or acts that may form the
basis of jurisdiction. They tend to be specific jurisdiction laws; the
act forming the basis of jurisdiction must be the basis of the
claim. Further, they tend to look very much alike. Most are pat-
terned after two models: the Illinois long-arm statute, passed in
1955,8 7 and the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure
Act,88 which was modeled somewhat after the Illinois act.8
Unfortunately, these similarities do not always lead to similar
results. Courts in different states do not even interpret identical
language identically.9 0 However, in an effort to put order into this
group, some categorization will be attempted.
85. See Tyson v. Whitaker & Son, Inc., 407 A.2d 1, 3 n.5 (Me. 1979).
86. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984), (citing
von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 1136, 1136-44 (1966)).
87. The original Illinois statute is reprinted in Casad, supra note 3, 14.01 at 4-3. See
also Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois,
1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 537.
88. Unif. Interstate and Int'l Procedure Act §1.03, 13 U.L.A. 361 (1986).
89. Comment to Unif. Interstate and Int'l Procedure Act § 1.03 at 362.
90. An example is the split in courts on the issue of whether a "tortious act" clause
encompasses a paternity suit. Compare Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Wright,
522 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla. 1988) (no) with Poindexter v. Willis, 87 Ill. App. 2d 213, 231
N.E.2d 1, 3 (1967) (yes).
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One logical dividing line would separate states where the courts
have interpreted their statutes to go to the limits of due process
from those that have not interpreted their statutes to go that far.
For the most part, this is a feasible, though not very enlightening
task.
Indeed, in almost every Type 2 state, court decisions have deter-
mined that the statute was intended to extend jurisdiction to the
extent permitted by the due process clause." However, this surface
homogeneity belies an amazing variety.2 To be sure, there are dif-
ferences in the way different courts interpret the command of In-
ternational Shoe v. Washington," Hanson v. Denckla94 and
World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson s But this is to be expected.
Even with the refinements in doctrine that have occurred in the
last decade, jurisdictional due process remains a vague area.
Phrases like "purposeful availment" leave a great deal of room for
interpretation. Not surprisingly, different courts may not solve
similar problems identically when using such fuzzy standards. But
this problem is one that a federal court can overcome as well. It
seems universally recognized that federal law governs the due pro-
cess standard.96 Thus, it will be the vagueness of the federal stan-
91. Many cases are cited in the footnotes in this section. However, some additional
examples are as follows: Cowan v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., 608 P.2d 394, 399 (Haw. 1980);
Suyermasa v. Myers, 420 N.E.2d 1334, 1340 (Ind. App. 1981); Mohamed v. Michael, 279 Md.
653, 370 A.2d 551, 553 (1977); State of North Dakota v. Newberger, 188 Mont. 323, 613 P.2d
1002, 1004 (1980); Customwood Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Downey Constr. Co., 102 N.M. 56, 691 P.2d
57, 58 (1984); Woodring v. Hall, 200 Kan. 597, 602, 438 P.2d 135 (1968); Dillon v. Funding
Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1977); Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Second Jud. Dist.
Ct., 87 Nev. 18, 479 P.2d 781, 784 (1971); Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of Amer., 93 Idaho 26,
454 P.2d 63, 67 (1969); Triplet v. R.M. Wade & Co., 261 S.C. 419, 200 S.E.2d 375 (1973);
State ex rel. Metal Serv. Center of Ga., Inc. v. Gaertner, 677 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Mo. 1984);
Roy v. Transairco, Inc., 291 A.2d 605 (N.H. 1972); Hummel v. Koehler, 458 A.2d 1187, 1190
(App. D.C. 1983). Ohio seems unable to make up its mind: compare Beacon Ins. Co. v.
Highway Equip. Co., 1988 WL 122466 (Ohio App. 1988) (statute goes to due process limits)
with Ohio St. Tie & Timber, Inc. v. Paris Lumber Co., 456 N.E.2d 1309, 1312-13 (Ohio App.
1982) (citing an earlier case holding that the statute does not go to due process limits). Two
notable exceptions are New York and Florida. Galgay v. Bulletin Co., 504 F.2d 1062, 1066
(2d Cir. 1974) (discussing New York law); Lavie v. Marketscope Research Co., 71 Misc. 2d
373, 374, 336 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (dicta); Mallard v. Aluminum Co. of Canada,
Ltd., 634 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981) (Florida law).
92. In this, as in the preceding sections, I have relied primarily on state court cases.
Because long-arm jurisdiction by definition involves out of state parties, many jurisdictional
cases are decided by federal courts sitting in diversity cases. but state cases are the authori-
tative view on the meaning of the state statutes.
93. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
94. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
95. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
96. E.g., Leney v. Plum Grove Bank, 670 F.2d 878, 880 (10th Cir. 1982); Empire Abra-
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dard, not the limits of the state statute that will be the problem
for a federal court. This is a problem of federal, not state law.
What makes Type 2 statutes so interesting, and difficult, to deal
with is that the actions of the state courts and legislatures do not
follow their words. The courts hold, or seem to hold, that the only
limits on the long-arm statutes are those prescribed by due pro-
cess. But the analysis used to solve individual cases is inconsistent
with the broad statement. In short, there appear to be limits on
the statutes apart from due process. The succeeding subsections
will examine some of the ways that the statutes and the interpreta-
tions depart from due process limits and the implications for fed-
eral courts.
1. The Limitations of State Law: Theory and Practice in
General
A threshold problem exists in some states. They seem unsure
whether or not their statute goes to the limits of due process. For
example, in Michigan several state and federal court decisions
seemed to find that Michigan's statute goes to the limits of due
process. But in Witbeck v. Bill Cody's Ranch Inn,95 in a cryptic
footnote, the Michigan Supreme Court cast doubt on that conclu-
sion.9 9 In Puerto Rico, the federal courts had held that the local
long-arm statute °00 went to the limits of due process. 101 However, a
recent federal case 1 noted a hitherto unpublished decision of the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court holding that the statute is not to be
interpreted so expansively. 03
Beyond these problems, there are large conceptual problems. My
sive Equip. Corp. v. H. H. Watson, Inc., 567 F.2d 554, 556 n.1 (3d Cir. 1977); Data Disc, Inc.
v. Systems Technology Assoc., Ltd., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286-87 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977).
97. E.g., McGraw v. Parsons, 369 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Mich. App. 1985); Northern Ins.
Co. of New York v. B. Elliott, Ltd., 323 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Mich. App. 1982); Hertzberg &
Noveck v. Spoon, 681 F.2d 474, 478 (6th Cir. 1982); American Business Overseas v. Methods
Research Prods., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1, 3 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
98. 428 Mich. 659, 411 N.W.2d 439 (1987).
99. 411 N.W.2d at 442 n.3. But see Nixon v. Celotex Corp., 693 F. Supp. 547, 550-51
(W.D. Mich. 1988) (asserting, after Witbeck, that Michigan's statute goes to due process
limits). Interestingly, Michigan has a separate statute conferring personal jurisdiction to de-
cide issues of status that expressly goes to the limits of the Constitution. MICH. COMP. LAWS.
ANN. § 600.775 (West 1981).
100. P.R. R. CIv. PROC. 4.7(a) (1968).
101. E.g., Mangual v. General Battery Corp., 710 F.2d 15, 19 (lst Cir. 1983).
102. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Greenblatt, 693 F. Supp. 1346 (D.P.R. 1988).
103. Id. at 1348, citing, Industrial Siderurgica, Inc. v. Thyssen Steel Caribbean, Inc.
slip op. at 721,22, n.5(D.P.R. June 30. 1983).
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premise in analyzing the state statutes and decisions interpreting
them is as follows. If the statutes truly go to the limits of due pro-
cess then they ought to be limited only by whatever that standard
is at the moment. If, however, the statutory interpretation remains
static while the due process limit changes, one would conclude that
state law imposes a limitation on the statute in addition to federal
constitutional restraints.
Except in one state, it appears that state courts have tried to
mold the limitations of their long-arm statutes to conform to the
recent series of jurisdictional cases from the Supreme Court.""
However, their task was simplified by the fact that most of the
Court's recent decisions have restricted, rather than expanded, ju-
risdiction. 10 5 Thus, state courts have not been faced with a new,
more expansive due process test. But suppose the due process
standard became more expansive. Did the states truly intend that
their statutes could be used to assert jurisdiction in a situation
where the conventional "minimum contacts within the forum
state" standard is not met?106
The answer to that question is difficult to determine. If state
courts truly mean what they appear to be saying-i.e., that their
statutes go to the limits of due process-one would expect the dis-
cussion in the cases to be quite simple. One would expect that
there would be little or no discussion of the long-arm statute, be-
yond a statement that it incorporates due process limits. Instead,
the decision would turn solely on whether due process is satisfied.
But in case after case, and state after state, something very differ-
ent happens. State courts are using a two-pronged analysis. First,
they determine whether the situation is covered by the long-arm
statute.107 Only then do they apply the due process standard. In
104. The exception seems to be Illinois, whose Supreme Court appears to have tired of
the constant changes in due process philosophy. Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp.,
86 Ill.2d 431, 427 N.E.2d 1203 (1981). But see Capital Associates Development Corp. v.
James E. Roberts-Ohbayashi Corp., 138 Ill. App.3d 1031, 487 N.E.2d 7 (1st Dist. 1985).
105. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84 (1978); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102 (1987). Cf. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (upholding jurisdiction against due process challenges).
106. As noted earlier this could happen in two ways. The Supreme Court could decide
to change the fourteenth amendment standard. Alternatively, it could decide that the fifth
amendment standard governing federal courts is not the same as the fourteenth amendment
standard.
107. A small sampling: Hust v. Northern Log, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 429, 431 (N.D. 1980);
Schofield v. Schofield, 338 S.E.2d 132, 134 (N. Car. App. 1986); Baker v. Baker, No. 3753
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that situation, what is a federal court to do?' And what does it
say about the limits of the state statute?
There may be a reasonable explanation for this use of the stat-
ute. As is the case with Type 3 statutes, state courts just may be
more comfortable using specific categories when possible. The cate-
gories of a typical Type 2 statute fit at least most situations in
which jurisdiction is proper. Invoking the statute may avoid the
need to discuss constitutional principles at length, at least in situa-
tions where jurisdiction obviously is proper. However, when state
courts restrict jurisdiction based on the statute without discussing
due process they may be permitting their statutes *to fall short of
due process limits.
Minnesota is consistent with the former analysis. Recent cases
using its long-arm statute 0 9 do use the specific categories. 1 0 How-
ever, when it appears that the case does not fit a statutory category
the Minnesota courts are willing to see whether jurisdiction could
be found if the only restriction is due process."' Thus, its courts
are using the statute when possible, but will not be tied to it if
doing so will unduly restrict jurisdiction. In this situation, one
could conclude that a Minnesota federal court is not bound by the
statutory restrictions, nor by a fourteenth amendment standard.
Other states do not follow this line of reasoning. Many state
courts have dismissed actions without any discussion of due pro-
cess, on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to show that defend-
ant's actions are within the long-arm statute."' This is an indica-
tion that something other than due process limits the reach of
these statutes.
That there is confusion about how to deal with the problem is
(Ohio App. 1989)(WESTLAW Allstates library); Krell v. Carolina Bank, 320 S.E.2d 491,
492-93 (S.C. App. 1984); McAvoy v. District Court, 757 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1988); Lombard
Bros., Inc. v. General Asset Mgmt. Co., 460 A.2d 481, 484-86 (Conn. 1983).
108. Sometimes federal courts take the easy route and convert the jurisdictional test
into a one step analysis, even if that is not consonant with the state's approach. Compare,
e.g., Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1420 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing Idaho law) with Beco
Corp. v. Roberts & Sons Constr. Co., Inc., 760 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Idaho 1988) (using a statu-
tory analysis before the due process test); see also Nixon v. Celotex Corp., 693 F. Supp. 547,
550-51 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (discussing Michigan law).
109. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 543.19 (West 1988).
110. E.g., Viske v. Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn. 1982).
111. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 433 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
112. Some recent examples include McClelland v. Doyle, 772 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo.
App. 1989); Pepe v. Concord Ranch, Inc., No. 61921 (Del. 1989)(WESTLAW Allstates li-
brary); Debreceni v. Bru-Jell Leasing Corp., 710 F. Supp. 15, 20 & n.12 (D. Mass. 1989);




exemplified by some recent cases dealing with the Texas long-arm
statute."1 3 In Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia " " the
Texas Supreme Court gave an expansive reading to its statute,
seemingly eliminating the need for statutory analysis. " ' In fact,
the Fifth Circuit recently held that the statutory analysis could be
collapsed into the constitutional analysis. " ' However, a recent
Texas appellate case relied solely on the statute to dismiss a suit
involving the refusal of a divorced father to pay for certain medical
expenses of his child. " 7 This is particularly puzzling because the
Texas Family Code expressly permits jurisdiction in "a suit affect-
ing the parent-child relationship" on any basis that would satisfy
the federal constitution. " 8 Though this suit arguably does not
come within the statute (it is about payment, rather than custody
and is not about establishing paternity), its spirit certainly cries
out for the use of an expansive analysis."1 9 Perhaps the case is an
aberration. But it illustrates the difficulties in understanding what
the state thinks its own statute means.
It may be that states regard the categories of their long-arm
statutes as being the only possible categories permitted by due
process. This would explain some of the problems described below
as "restricted due process." A court that believed that due process
only permitted certain categories of long-arm jurisdiction would re-
quire that the assertion of jurisdiction fit within one of those
categories.
But this is an unsatisfying explanation. The history of long-arm
jurisdiction since International Shoe is marked by the pliability of
the minimum contacts standard in a variety of contexts. It is hard
to accept the explanation that a belief in the all-encompassing na-
ture of their statutory categories explains the case law very well.
One would think that, at least recently, legislators and courts
would know better. But perhaps that is a naive belief.
Another problem in determining the true limits of the statutes is
113. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1986). See the discussion of
the statute in note 40 supra.
114. 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), opinion
withdrawn, 677 S.W.2d 19 (1984).
115. 638 S.W.2d at 872; see Southern Clay Prods., Inc. v. Guardian Royal Exchange
Assurance, Ltd., 762 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. App. 1988).
116. Irving v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 385 (5th Cir. 1989).
117. Runnels v. Firestone, 746 S.W.2d 845, 853 (Tex. App. 1988).
118. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051(4) (Vernon 1986).
119. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, discussed in note 40,
supra, arguably provides for jurisdiction here as well.
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the way state legislatures treat their statutes. In several states, the
state legislature has amended the long-arm statute to add catego-
ries even after its courts have held that the statute goes to the
limits of due process.120 That is plainly inconsistent with the no-
tion that the categories are irrelevant and that the statute reaches
as far as is permissible.12" '
An interesting illustration of this is in North Dakota. Looking
only at the case law, one would see a fair amount of consistency.
From 1975, in Hebron Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick and Tile Co., 122
to the present the North Dakota courts have consistently held that
the statute goes to the limits of due process.' 2 ' However, the statu-
tory categories have undergone some interesting shifts since 1975.
The original rule was modeled after the Uniform Act and con-
tained a conventional set of categories. Effective January 1, 1976, a
new section was added to the statute. This new section permitted
North Dakota courts to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents,
[e]njoying any other status or capacity within this state, including cohabita-
tion, or engaging in any other activity having such contact with this state
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him does not offend against
traditional notions of justice or fair play or the due process of law." 4
Two facets of the new section merit special attention. First, that
the legislature felt a need to add "cohabitation within the state" to
the jurisdictional acts is interesting. This addition was made de-
spite the fact that in 1975, in Hebron Brick, the North Dakota Su-
preme Court held that the statute goes to due process limits.
120. E.g., North Dakota: N.D. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(2)(H) (Supp. 1989), discussed in detail
below; Massachusetts: MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 223A, § 3(h) (West Supp. 1989) (added 1987)
and § 3(g) (added 1976), "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. of Amer. v. Seneca Foods Corp., 361
Mass. 441, 280 N.E.2d 423, 424 (1972); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24(7) (1987) (added
1983), Ted R. Brown & Assoc., Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 611 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 1980); Virginia:
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(8)(iii) (Supp. 1989) (added 1988), John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chro-
modern Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 180 S.E.2d 664, 667 (1971).
121. However, the same thing happened in Tennessee even after a Type 3 clause was
added without any evident effect on the interpretation of the statute. See discussion in text
at note 66 supra.
122. 234 N.W.2d 250, 256 (N.D. 1975).
123. See, e.g., Lumber Mart, Inc. v. Haas Int'l Sales & Service, Inc., 269 N.W.2d 83, 86
(N.D. 1978); Hust v. Northern Log, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 429, 431 (N.D. 1980); United Accounts,
Inc. v. Quackenbush, 434 N.W.2d 567, 569 (N.D. 1989). Since at least 1980, it has been
evident that North Dakota is what I call a "restricted due process" state. See Hust v.
Northern Log, Inc., 297 N.W.2d at 431; United Accounts, Inc. v. Quackenbush, 434 N.W.2d
at 569. That is, its long-arm analysis requires a two step process, the first step being to find
a category within which to put the case. See the discussion of restricted due process in
subsection 2, below.
124. N.D. R. Civ. P. 4(H), as amended effective January 1, 1976.
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Second, the remainder of the statute (starting with "engaging in
any other activity") is so broad that it looks like a Type 3 catchall
clause. However, effective January 1, 1979, the statute was
amended again. The section quoted above (subdivision (H)) was
split into two subsections. New subdivision (I) contained the co-
habitation clause and added "sexual intercourse" to the list of ju-
risdictional acts. The due process of law phrase was removed from
subdivision (H) and placed at the beginning of the statute in front
of the list of jurisdictional categories. The "engaging in any other
activity" language was placed in subdivision (I) but was now lim-
ited by the phrase "within this state.1125 However, both before and
after these changes, the courts' interpretation of the statute re-
mained the same; it goes to the limits of due process. 126 Just the
addition of "sexual intercourse" to the list of jurisdictional acts
seems to belie that conclusion, at least before the amendment.
Moreover, the 1979 amendment appears to impose a limitation on
the statute not found in the 1976 amendment-that the activity
must occur within the state. Obviously, determining the meaning
of such a statute will be a daunting task.
Perhaps this can be explained as another by-product of the be-
lief that the long-arm categories are all-encompassing. When that
belief is proven wrong-by other states taking a more aggressive
approach to long-arm jurisdiction-then these states amend their
statutes to conform to the new status quo.
There is more to the problem of Type 2 statutes than individual
states' aberrations from what might otherwise appear to be the
norm. There is a pattern that can be discerned here. The apparent
deviations from the outer limits of due process often fall into cer-
12.5. The revised statute, N.D. R. Civ. P. 4(H) (as amended effective January 1, 1979),
provides, in relevant part:
(2) PERSONAL JURISDICTION BASED UPON CONTACTS. A court of this state may exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent as to any
claim for relief arising from the person's having such contact with this state that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over him does not offend against traditional notions
of justice or fair play or the due process of law under one or more of the following
circumstances:...
(H) enjoying any other legal status or capacity within this state; or
(I) engaging in any other activity, including cohabitation or sexual intercourse, within
this state.
Subdivision (H) thus was reduced to giving jurisdiction over a legal status or capacity. That
this was meant as a limiting factor is evident in the Explanatory Note. The Note says that
the amendment restricted the "any activity" language in the former section (H) to legal
status. North Dakota Court Rules, Explanatory Note to Rule 4 at 20 (West 1983).
126. See cases cited in note 120 supra.
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tain definable analytical subcategories. One category is states that
amend their statutes after their courts hold that the statute does
go to the limits of due process. The next sections discuss two other
such areas, representing some of the more pervasive deviations
from the limits of due process.
2. "Restricted due process"
The situation in Massachusetts is illustrative of the analysis that
is found in several states. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts has made it clear that one must find a category in the
long-arm statute on which to base jurisdiction.'27 This would seem
to restrict its statute to less than the due process limit. As noted
earlier, creative litigants are constantly expanding the categories of
possible jurisdictional acts. Limiting jurisdiction to the specific
acts found in a statute (particularly one that has not been
amended recently) may seriously restrict its reach. However, the
same cases state that when a statutory basis is found, one can as-
sert jurisdiction within that category to the limits of due process. 12 8
This is an obvious contradiction, but the courts state it without
seeming to notice.
Similar analyses are found in cases in Arkansas. There, one com-
mentator concluded tliat only one provision of the Arkansas long-
arm statute-"transacting business in this State"-is "co-extensive
with due process. '"129 His analysis (borne out by my independent
reading of the case law that existed at the time) is that Arkansas
cases purporting to extend the statute to due process limits all in-
volved the transacting business section. 30 Thus, he concludes that
the remainder of the statute falls short of due process. However,
after the publication of that article, the Arkansas Supreme Court
extended this interpretation to other parts of the statute.' 3' Even
then, the Court did not ignore the categories, but found that other
categories went to the limits of due process.
For convenience, one may call such analysis "restricted due pro-
127. E.g., Morrill v. Tong, 390 Mass. 120, 453 N.E.2d 1221, 1227 (1983); Good Hope
Ind., Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 378 Mass. 1, 389 N.E.2d 76, 79-80 (1979).
128. 453 N.E.2d at 1228; 389 N.E.2d at 79-80. See Gray v. O'Brien, 777 F.2d 864, 866
(1st Cir. 1985) (noting that the statute goes to due process limits only within the listed
categories).
129. Watkins, The Arkansas Long-Arm Statute: Just How Long Is It?, 40 ARK. L.
REV. 21, 44 (1986).
130. Id. at 45-46.
131. Kilcrease v. Butler, 293 Ark. 454, 739 S.W.2d 139 (1987) (long-arm jurisdiction
predicated on tortious injury within the state).
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cess." The meaning of restricted due process is subject to many
possible interpretations. It may mean nothing more than that any
assertion of jurisdiction must be within due process limits. That is,
even if there is a category to cover defendant's actions, due process
considerations limit the state's ability to exert authority over the
defendant. Thus, if the statute somehow could be used in a way
that would fall outside due process, the constitution would reign it
in. But obviously it is possible for a state to interpret its categories
in a manner that falls short of due process. In that case, pointing
to due process as a limiting factor would be incorrect, or at least
misleading. Moreover, the tenor of the cases is that they perceive
limits within the long-arm statute itself. The courts are making a
statement that the long-arm statute cannot be ignored by jumping
to a due process analysis in every jurisdictional case. Therefore,
true restricted due process must mean something different.
One way to ascertain its meaning is to assume that fairness, or
some other more lenient standard, replaced minimum contacts
with the state as the touchstone of jurisdictional due process anal-
ysis. Then one would ask how that change affects states subscrib-
ing to restricted due process theory. The categories in a typical
Type 2 statute are bound up with some sort of "contact" with the
forum state. If the categories remain meaningful, then a funda-
mental change in due process analysis that divorces constitutional-
ity from contacts makes it difficult to give a meaning to the catego-
ries that is co-terminous with the more lenient due process
standard. If the categories in the statute are meaningful after the
change, this may mean little more than that the statute does not
go to the limits of due process, despite the courts' assertions to the
contrary. The range of jurisdictional contacts permitted by the
constitution does not fall entirely into the categories set forth in a
long-arm statute. That is one of the reasons that several states ei-
ther have abandoned categories or have added a catchall and cre-
ated a Type 3 statute.
But the state could assert that, although its statute as a whole
falls short of what due process would allow, restricted due process
is more than a statement of the obvious. Under this interpretation,
the due process test could be used to determine the appropriate
parameters of any individual category. That has a surface appeal
but leads to a problem. If the state defines the acts falling within
the categories restrictively, is it legitimate to say that the category
nevertheless goes to the limits of due process?
For instance, suppose a long-time resident of state A files a pa-
Vol. 28:233
Long-arm Jurisdiction
ternity suit in state A against a resident of state B. If the couple
conceived the child in state A, it clearly would be constitutional to
assert jurisdiction in state A. Moreover, it is at least arguable that
such activity on the part of defendant is tortious.'32 However, some
states do not deem this to be within the "tortious act" provisions
of their long-arm statutes. They reason that a refusal to pay child
support in the absence of an admission or adjudication of paternity
is not a tort.133 Thus, to say that your "tortious act" provision goes
to the limits of due process, as long as there is a "tortious act" is
meaningless. It is no more than a state-imposed limitation on its
long-arm statute.
However, if the state uses the due process test to assist in defin-
ing the meaning of "tortious act," then restricted due process anal-
ysis may have some meaning. Thus, a state could assert that one
should first look to see whether the activity is a constitutionally
permissible basis for jurisdiction while at the same time examining
the long-arm categories. If the action is a constitutional basis of
jurisdiction, the court should stretch as far as possible in determin-
ing whether the act comes within a long-arm category. To use the
above example, if a paternity suit is colorably tortious, and if it
would be constitutional to assert jurisdiction, then the long-arm
statute should permit jurisdiction. Only when it is clear beyond
doubt that this act is not within any category would the long-arm
categories become a basis for rejecting jurisdiction.1 31
This explanation of restricted due process may not help a federal
court that wants to use a fifth amendment due process standard.
The categories in a Type 2 statute ordinarily require some connec-
tion between the activity and the state. The most common catego-
ries of this type are "transacting business in the state" and com-
mitting a "tortious act within the state." Even if these categories
coincide with the current outer limits of the fourteenth amend-
ment, a fifth amendment standard may be more expansive. 3 5 For a
federal court to justify using a more lenient standard requires
making certain assumptions. Primarily, one would have to assume
132. See, e.g., Poindexter v. Willis, 87 Ill. App. 2d 213, 231 N.E.2d 1 (1967).
133. E.g., Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Wright, 522 So. 2d 838
(Fla. 1988).
134. Professor Currie suggests a somewhat similar analysis for the Illinois statute in
his article. Currie, supra note 87 at 553.
135. See. e.g., Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1530 (9th Cir. 1989) (using a stan-




that, when the state legislature permitted jurisdiction over defend-
ants who "transact business within the state" it really meant to
permit jurisdiction over defendants who "transact business in a
manner permitting the assertion of jurisdiction by the state consis-
tent with the constitution." On the surface this argument seems
similar to that made above with respect to the meaning of the
Rhode Island statute. There is an important difference, however.
Rhode Island clearly wanted to dispense with categories and do
whatever was possible to broaden the bases of jurisdiction. States
using restricted due process analysis have not dispensed with the
categories and have not indicated as clearly a willingness to divorce
their statutes from conduct connected with the state. If we say
that "transacting business within the state" really means "trans-
acting business in any manner that would permit jurisdiction" we
must take care not to render the categories meaningless. Other-
wise, a federal court would be rewriting the statute in a manner
expressly rejected by the state courts.
There is serious question whether an interpretation of the cate-
gories that divorces them from contacts is consistent with legisla-
tive intent. Suppose in our paternity suit above, the courts of state
A have permitted the assertion of jurisdiction where the child was
conceived in state A. Now suppose in another case the child was
conceived while the couple was on vacation in state C. Further as-
sume that this was a one-night affair and the defendant had no
other contacts with state A. Under those circumstances, it might
be unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment for the state
A courts to assert jurisdiction over the defendant. However, as-
sume the defendant is a Canadian citizen and has "minimum con-
tacts" with the United States. Under other circumstances, courts
have indicated that federal courts can assert jurisdiction over alien
defendants meeting that standard. 136 One might well argue that a
federal court in state A using restricted due process analysis
should be permitted to assert jurisdiction in this case.13 7 After all,
the plaintiff (and presumably the child) live in state A and state A
is as good a forum as any in the United States for this litigation.
State A has an interest in protecting the child and state C has lit-
tle interest except the possible prevention of fornication within its
borders. Thus, it may not be fundamentally unfair to have the liti-
136. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315-16
(9th Cir. 1985) (case brought under the Securities Exchange Act).
137. I recognize that fairness concerns may make it unlikely that even a federal court
would try to assert jurisdiction in this case.
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gation in A. (Indeed, state A may be closer to Canada than state C,
where the child was conceived.) The question is whether one can
reasonably assume that the state A long-arm statute can be read to
permit jurisdiction in those circumstances. We have now severed
all connections with state A, except plaintiff's residence.'38 It is not
clear that state A, which refuses to ignore its long-arm categories,
intended its statute to reach that far. That is the difficult problem
of interpretation facing the federal court in state A.
The problems of a federal court are symptomatic of a general
problem with this analysis. Although a due process test can tell
you whether a particular activity falls within the constitutional
limits for jurisdiction, it is not designed to test whether an activity
falls within such state-defined categories as "torts," "doing busi-
ness" and the like. Defining such terms is the key to the analysis,
however. Due process tests cannot readily distinguish between tor-
tious acts and other (constitutionally permissible) activities. Thus,
restricted due process analysis may be no more than an exhorta-
tion not to be stingy when defining the limits of the categories.
And it may not even be that, as the next section illustrates.
3. Problems with Tortious Act Clauses
The non-due process limits placed on state long-arm statutes are
acutely obvious in the interpretations of state tortious act clauses.
The earliest cases in this area showed a split between expansive
and restrictive readings of these clauses. The major fights were
over the meaning of "tortious act within the state." Early cases
interpreting the Illinois statute gave an expansive reading to that
statute's tortious act clause, particularly in products liability
cases. 139 New York took a more limited view of the "within the
state" language of its statutes. It required that the tortious act, not
just the injury, occur in the state."10 Naturally, this limited the
usefulness of long-arm statutes in products liability cases. Many
legislatures either amended their statutes to add a second tortious
act clause or enacted statutes containing a clause specifically cov-
ering torts committed outside the state having an effect within the
138. One could stretch the example further by assuming that plaintiff moved to state
A only weeks before filing suit.
139. E.g., Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961); see Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673, 674 (1957); Currie, supra note
87 at 538-46.
140. Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 20-24, 209 N.E.2d 68, 77-79
(1965). See Currie, supra note 87 at 547-53.
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state.141
Divining the meaning of a long-arm statute becomes even more
difficult in a state that has two tortious act clauses-one for torts
within the state and another for torts outside the state causing in-
jury within the state. 142 Often the latter clause has some additional
limiting factors such as defendant must obtain substantial revenue
from interstate commerce or from goods sold within the state.'43
With such statutes, neither tortious act clause alone coincides with
the limits of due process in the "tortious act" area. It is hard to
imagine how one would use restricted due process analysis to ex-
pand the contours of a clause that is limited by the existence of
another clause within the same statute. Possibly one could read
the two clauses together and apply the due process test to anything
arguably within either clause, without being particular about which
clause would cover the activity. However, this strains statutory in-
terpretation and is inconsistent with the passage of a statute with
two separate clauses. If the legislature intended them to be read in
this way, it could easily have collapsed them into one clause.
Another limitation placed on tortious act clauses is the definition
of a "tort." A common problem in this area is paternity suits. As
noted above, in subsection 2, there is a split in the courts about
whether a failure to acknowledge paternity and to pay child sup-
port constitutes a tort."' Most states seem to agree that states can
constitutionally assert jurisdiction in such cases, at least where
conception took place in the state, and many have amended their
statutes to so provide. 45 Thus, the definition of a "tort" can limit
the statute beyond the mandate of due process.
A detailed discussion of all states' tortious act clauses would fill
141. E.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-
4-101 C.l.(d) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91(3) (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(2)
(a)4 (Michie 1985). The Comments to the Uniform Act, which contains two tortious act
clauses, note that its "tortious act within the state" section may not be as broad as that of
states like Illinois. 13 U.L.A. at 363 (1986).
142. See, e.g., Unif. Interstate and Int'l Procedure Act §§ 1.03(a)(3), (4), 13 U.L.A.
355, 362 (1986).
143. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1978); ARK. STAT. § 16-4-101
C.l.(d) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91(3) (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(2)(a)4
(Michie 1985); see ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015(4) (1983).
144. Compare Poindexter v. Willis, 87 Ill. App. 2d 213, 231 N.E.2d 1 (1967) with De-
partment of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Wright, 522 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1988).
145. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 5-514(f) (Michie 1988); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-
103.2 (Supp. 1988) (this statute is separate from Maryland's general long-arm statute); Mo.




a large book. 4" However, a few notable examples will serve to illus-
trate the problems that federal (and state) courts face when using
these statutes.
The experiences of Virginia and the District of Columbia are in-
structive. Both have Type 2 statutes patterned after the Uniform
Interstate and International Procedure Act.1 7 The Uniform Act
contains two separate "tortious act" provisions. One permits juris-
diction where the tortious act (or omission) is committed "in this
state."' 48 The other allows jurisdiction over defendants who com-
mit tortious acts outside the state if the injury occurs in the state
and if the defendant maintains certain other contacts with the
state as defined in the statute. 49 In both jurisdictions, in cases re-
lying on the "transacting business" portion of the statute, the
courts have held that jurisdiction is intended to be coextensive
with due process.' 0 However, in cases involving the "tortious act"
provision the courts are much more circumspect in their
evaluations.
In Schleit v. Warren,'5' defendants in an abuse of process case
claimed that they were not subject to jurisdiction in Virginia be-
cause they had committed no tortious act within Virginia. The dis-
trict court noted in a footnote that "the Virginia long-arm statute
has been construed to extend personal jurisdiction to the limits of
due process.' 2 Nevertheless, the court conducted a thorough
analysis of the statutory provision before finding that defendants
had committed a tortious act within the state. 53 Only then did the
court engage in a due process discussion. In Early v. Travel Lei-
sure Concepts, Inc.,' 54 the court found the same section of the Vir-
146. In fact, Professor Casad devotes considerable attention to the issue in his book.
Casad, supra note 3, 4.02[2] and Chapter 7.
147. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A) (Supp. 1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a) (1989).
The Uniform Act is found at 13 U.L.A. 355 (1986).
148. Unif. Interstate and Int'l Procedure Act § 1.03(a)(3), 13 U.L.A. 361 (1986).
149. Id. § 1.03(a)(4). The other contacts are: regular doing or solicitation of business,
deriving substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in the state or another persistent
course of conduct in the state.
150. E.g., Danville Plywood Corp. v. Plain and Fancy Kitchens, Inc., 218 Va. 533, 238
S.E.2d 800, 802 (1977); John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 180
S.E.2d 664, 667 (1971) (interpreting prior statute); Hummel v. Koehler, 458 A.2d 1187, 1190
(App. D.C. 1983).
151. 693 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Va. 1988).
152. 693 F. Supp. at 419 n.5. However, neither case cited by the court in the footnote
involved the tortious act sections of the Virginia statute.
153. Id. at 419-21.
154. 669 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Va. 1987).
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ginia long-arm statute155 inapplicable where the owners of a Jamai-
can hotel were impleaded by defendants in a case arising from a
travel agency's alleged failure to warn of dangerous conditions at
the hotel. The court held that no act "within the state" was com-
mitted by the third-party defendants. The court asserted that its
conclusion "is underscored by [the] clearly manifested intent [of
Virginia] to restrain the operations of the long-arm statute to the
limits of due process. ' 156 It is hard to see why the court believed
that its conclusion was bolstered by the statute being limited to
due process. The court's statement views the legislative intent as a
restraining, rather than broadening, influence. Given that due pro-
cess is the outer limit to which a statute could go, that conclusion
is an odd one.
In neither case, however, did the courts attempt to reconcile the
contradiction between a statute that supposedly reaches due pro-
cess limits and (i) their use of a possibly limiting statutory analysis
and (ii) the existence of two tortious act clauses in the statute.
Another federal district court took the bolder step of stating that
Virginia's long-arm statute "intentionally stops short of the outer
limits of due process." 5 ' In this case, the court noted the existence
of the two tortious act clauses, but opined that even the section
permitting jurisdiction when the act was committed outside the
state58 would not apply. The court apparently believed that the
restrictions in that section would not allow jurisdiction in the case
before it. 59
In the District of Columbia the courts have been even more ex-
plicit about the limits of the District's long-arm statute. When in-
terpreting the "tortious act" sections of the statute, courts have
not used the expansive language found in the "transacting busi-
155. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(a)(3) (Supp. 1989).
156. 669 F. Supp. at 132 (citation omitted).
157. Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 580 F. Supp. 1082, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (interpreting the
Virginia statute).
158. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(a)(4) (Supp. 1989).
159. 580 F. Supp. at 1087. Cf. First America First, Inc. v. National Assn. of Bank
Women, 802 F.2d 1511 (4th Cir. 1986) (upholding jurisdiction under the statutory section
relating to torts committed outside the state). This latter case found that the defendant's
"persistent" conduct (required under that section) could consist of continuous communica-
tions with its members in Virginia. Id. at 1515. In Davis, plaintiff did not attempt to use
that section and the court's opinion was not the result of a careful analysis. However, if one
truly believed that the statute was limited only by due process - which the Davis court did
not - it would be sensible to attempt to examine other sections, even if plaintiff did not.
This would avoid dismissal on a technicality in a situation where due process might permit
the exercise of jurisdiction.
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ness" cases. A leading example is Margoles v. Johns.16 This was a
slander action alleging that defendant telephoned people in the
District and made slanderous statements about plaintiff. The calls
were made from defendant's office in Wisconsin. Although the
court determined that the injury took place in the District, it held
that the long-arm statute did not reach this conduct. The court
discussed various "tortious act" statutes in other states.' Its opin-
ion distinguished statutes that follow the Uniform Act (with dual
tortious act clauses) from those, like the Illinois statute, with single
tortious act clauses. 162 It concluded that the broad reach of tortious
act statutes exemplified by Gray v. American Radiator & Stan-
dard Sanitary Corp.6 3 was not intended by the Uniform Act.6 4
Thus, the court concluded that no tortious act was committed
within the District. Finally, the court noted the oddity that case
law in nearby states with nearly identical statutes-Maryland and
Virginia' 65-had struggled with, namely the reach of a statute that,
in part, purports to go to the limits of due process but which has
restrictive wording. On that issue, the court concluded that "the
developing case law in both states supports the view that while
that statement [the statute goes to the limits of due process] may
prove true as to some of the Subsections . .. , it does not as to
others .. .166 The Margoles decision has been followed by more
recent cases interpreting the District's long-arm statute.
6 7
The District's statute has an added quirk that makes interpreta-
tion even more complicated. In 1983, the statute was amended to
add a section permitting jurisdiction in cases involving a "marital
or parent and child relationship in the District of Columbia."'6 8
The added section lists four specific subcategories of circumstances
160. 483 F.2d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
161. 483 F.2d at 1216-17.
162. Id.
163. 22 Il. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
164. 483 F.2d at 1216. The court cited comments from the Uniform Act noting that its
reach may not be equivalent to that of Gray. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that the
District's statute adds another restriction to the Uniform Act - that the injury occur
within the state.
165. The District's statute was modeled after the statutes of those two states. See 483
F.2d at 1215.
166. 483 F.2d at 1221.
167. E.g., Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Tavoulareas v. Comnas,
720 F.2d 192, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 990-91
(D.C. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982) (dicta, noting with apparent ap-
proval the more restrictive reading of the "tortious act" clauses in the Maryland cases).
168. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a)(7) (1989), added by D.C. LAw 4-200, § 4.
1990
Duquesne Law Review
under which jurisdiction in marital or parent/child cases can be
had. There is then a fifth sub-subsection which reads as follows:
(E) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraphs (A) through (D), the
court may exercise personal jurisdiction if there is any basis consistent with
the United States Constitution for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. '
Arguably this language recognizes that other sections of the stat-
ute do not reach the limits of due process. Or, it may be only a
recognition that the statute as a whole fails to reach all possible
jurisdictional contacts. It raises the possibility that a federal court
might even use two constitutional standards when testing this stat-
ute. If the "transacting business" or other sections of the statute
incorporate a fourteenth amendment standard, that would have to
be used to test assertions under those subsections. However, in
view of the expansive language in subsection (a)(7)(E) a fifth
amendment standard seems appropriate in cases using that part of
the statute. 170  And a third standard-a purely statutory
one-would be followed in tortious act cases where the statute ob-
viously falls short of due process limits.
Other states with similar dual tortious act sections take conflict-
ing positions. In Delaware, the Supreme Court has determined that
the entire statute, including the tortious act provisions, should be
"broadly construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent
possible under the due process clause.""17 In Georgia, an appellate
court, in Flint v. Gust,72 expressed the belief that the extra factors
contained in the subsection regarding tortious acts committed
outside the state are required by due process and that the statute
169. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a)(7)(E) (1989). This section of the District statute was
added as an amendment to the District's adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act of 1982. Transcript of Legislative Session of the Council of the District of Colum-
bia, Nov. 16, 1982 at 54-55. This statute apparently was to be based on a comparable Texas
statute. Id. Texas has similar language in a special statute - not part of its long-arm stat-
ute - relating only to cases "affecting the parent-child relationship." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 11.051(4) (Vernon 1986).
170. However, because marital and parent/child cases raise issues that are uniquely
local in character, it would be unusual for a federal court to find the necessary federal inter-
est to apply a less restrictive standard under the fifth amendment permitting jurisdiction
where the state court would not do so.
171. LaNuova D & B, S.p.A. v. Bowe Co., Inc., 513 A.2d 764, 768 (Del. 1986) (citations
omitted). Oddly, the Delaware Supreme Court has stated that its statute is patterned after
the Illinois law, which has only a single tortious act section. Mid-Atlantic Machine & Fabric,
Inc. v. Chesapeake Shipbuilding, Inc., 492 A.2d 250 (Del. 1985). But a more recent lower
court decision correctly noted that the origin of the statute is the Uniform Act. Interna-
tional Playtex, Inc. v. B. & E. Machinery Co., 1987 WL 17178 (Del. Super. 1987) (not re-
ported officially).
172. 351 S.E.2d 95 (Ga. App. 1986), rev'd, 257 Ga. 129, 356 S.E.2d 513 (1987).
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therefore does nothing more than express the legislature's desire to
go to those limits.1 73 If Gray v. American Radiator is still good law,
however, the extra contacts in the Georgia statute would not be
constitutionally necessary. 1 4 The appellate opinion in Flint seem-
ingly wrote out the additional factors. It was subsequently reversed
by the Georgia Supreme Court, which directed the lower court to
apply the statute as written."7 5 On remand, the court of appeals
opined that, because an earlier decision giving the statute a broad
reading had not been overruled by the Supreme Court's opinion in
Flint, "clarification of the Supreme Court's position on this impor-
tant issue will have to await a future litigation.'
'1 6
Tortious act clauses are very vulnerable to being limited by more
than due process. Dual tortious act clause statutes are even more
vulnerable. In the first place, widely differing views on the meaning
of "tort" or "tortious" may impose limits greater than those set by
due process. Where a statute requires extra contacts-such as
substantial revenue being derived from interstate com-
merce-restrictive readings can be expected to occur. This is not a
major problem, except where the state court also asserts that the
statute goes to the limits of due process. Although such statutes
may reach the current limits of due process, it would take a tor-
tured reading to make them fit a much more lenient due process
standard. This makes ascertaining the true meaning of the statute
difficult. If state courts really want to use their statutes in a more
restrictive manner, it behooves the courts to say that explicitly,
rather than obscuring the issue by saying that the statute reaches
the limits of due process, and then interpreting it in a way that
falls short of due process.
173. Flint v. Gust, 351 S.E.2d 95, 97 (Ga. App. 1986), rev'd, 257 Ga. 129, 356 S.E.2d
513 (1987).
174. Some doubt on the continued viability of Gray was cast by Part II-A of the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (requir-
ing that the defendant's acts be directed at the state). However, four Justices dissented
from that portion of the opinion, and a fifth, Justice Stevens, appeared to side with the
dissenters. See id. at 116 (opinion of Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 122
(opinion of Stevens, J.).
175. 257 Ga. 129, 356 S.E.2d 513 (1987).
176. Flint v. Gust, 184 Ga. App. 242, 361 S.E.2d 722, 723 (1987). See also Stacy v.
Hilton Head Seafood Co., 688 F. Supp. 599, 604 n.4 (S.D. Ga. 1988). Interestingly, a recent
federal case, Quikrette Cos. v. Nomix Corp., 705 F. Supp. 568 (N.D. Ga. 1989), stated that it
did not regard Flint as restricting the Georgia statute to less than due process limits. 705 F.
Supp. at 571 n.2.
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4. Illinois-Losing Patience With Shifting Due Process
Standards
For years, Illinois had been viewed as a state whose Type 2 stat-
ute truly went to the limits of due process. In Nelson v. Miller'
77
and Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.17
the Illinois Supreme Court all but abandoned any serious use of
the categories contained in the long-arm statute. 179 Recently, how-
ever, Illinois has done an apparent about face. In Green v. Ad-
vance Ross Electronics Corp.'80 and Cook Associates, Inc. v. Lex-
ington United Corporation'"' the Illinois Supreme Court firmly
reinstated the use of the long-arm categories. In Green, in language
reaffirmed by Cook, the Court stated that it did not interpret the
earlier Nelson decision as signaling the abandonment of the long-
arm categories. Further, the Court stated that "A statute worded
in the way ours is should have a fixed meaning without regard to
changing concepts of due process. . ". .'" In light of this, the Sev-
enth Circuit recently stated that Illinois no longer interprets its
statute to go to the limits of due process.18  However, the lower
Illinois courts have not been unanimous in adopting this interpre-
tation of Green and Cook. 84
It is not clear what the Illinois Supreme Court had in mind when
it prescribed a "fixed meaning" for its statute. Perhaps it wanted
to create a body of law that would give more guidance to practi-
tioners and judges than is given by the "minimum contacts" stan-
dard. One still could assume that the statute reaches the current
limits of due process. Under that theory, a state court decision that
a particular fact pattern does not satisfy the statute would imply
that the facts also contravene due process. However, a series of
such decisions would create a body of precedent on which practi-
177. 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
178. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
179. See, e.g., Morton v. Environmental Land Systems, Ltd., 370 N.E.2d 1106, 1109-10
(Ill. App. 1977). This is tempered somewhat by the fact that the Illinois statute was
amended in 1964 to add a category relating to marital dissolutions. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110 2-209(5) (Supp. 1989).
180. 86 Ill. 2d 431, 427 N.E.2d 1203 (1981).
181. 87 Ill. 2d 190, 429 N.E.2d 847 (1981).
182. 427 N.E.2d at 1206; 429 N.E.2d at 850.
183. Small v. Sheba Investors, Inc., 811 F.2d 1163, 1164-65 (7th Cir. 1987).
184. E.g., Capital Associates Devel. Corp. v. James E. Roberts-Ohbayashi Corp., 487
N.E.2d 7, 11 (111. App. 1985) (court, citing Nelson v. Miller, says the statute does go to the
limits of due process notwithstanding Green).
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tioners could rely."8 5
5. Using Type 2 Statutes in Federal Court
Federal courts must tread carefully when using Type 2 statutes.
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Omni Capital fed-
eral courts must respect the limits placed by states on their long-
arm statutes. As discussed above, ascertaining those limits is not
always easy. Moreover, federal courts often use state statutes in
situations for which the statutes presumably were not
designed-i.e. federal questions.18 6 But some general conclusions
can be drawn from the case law.
First, it is evident that the broad statements in some cases that
a state long-arm statute goes to the "limits of due process" are not
true. Limiting jurisdiction to enumerated categories inevitably
leads to omissions, unless the categories are very broadly con-
strued. Indeed, in places like Maryland, Virginia and the District
of Columbia it is clear that the "tortious act" clauses of the long-
arm statute have been interpreted to contain restrictions not man-
dated by due process. In diversity cases, these restrictions should
not prove to be a major problem for application by federal courts.
To the extent that the fact patterns in federal courts mimic previ-
ously decided cases in state court, the federal court simply abides
by the restrictions. 17 In states with certification processes, federal
courts could benefit by having the state Supreme Court clarify the
limits of the statute. Most diversity cases do not involve large fed-
eral interests; federal courts need not worry too much about un-
duly restricting their authority to resolve disputes in this area.'
Federal question cases pose a more difficult problem. Because
they seldom arise in state court, there is less likelihood of the same
fact pattern having been examined by state courts. Naturally,
185. See generally Comment, Illinois Long Arm Jurisdiction: The Implications of a
"Fixed Meaning", 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 635, 653-62 (1983).
186. Although state courts have the ability to hear many federal claims, the availabil-
ity of removal and the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction in some areas limits the actual
number of such cases litigated in the state courts. This problem was discussed in Welkowitz,
supra note 8 at 49-51.
187. This simple framework may not work in all cases. Because long-arm jurisdiction
by definition involves out of state parties, many such cases will end up in federal court if
they lack an in-state defendant. Thus, federal courts may end up with fact patterns not seen
in state courts because most of the long-arm cases are in federal courts.
188. Major disasters which result in complex, multistate litigation may be an excep-
tion. See generally Rowe & Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Ju-
risdiction. 135 U. PENN. L. REv. 7 (1986).
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there may be analogous situations to draw on-many states have
substantive statutes that duplicate federal ones.'8 9 Many federal
statutory violations can be labeled as "torts" and treated under
tortious act clauses, while still others may constitute "transacting
business" or there may be elements of both present. On the other
hand, there are federal interests at stake in these cases that the
state legislature probably did not consider when enacting its long-
arm statute. And the state may have created its statutory restric-
tions because it believed that it had no other choice. This may ex-
plain the "within the state" limits on the jurisdictional acts in
most Type 2 statutes. States attempting to legislate to the limits of
their constitutional power would see minimum contacts with the
state as the limit.
States may be less generous about stretching their statutes when
the connection between the defendant and the state is tenuous and
more so when the plaintiff's connection with the state is recent. An
example would be a paternity suit filed by a mother who has re-
cently moved to the state. States may want to discourage suits to
prevent overcrowding of their courts or possibly to appease local
special interests. Those concerns-particularly regarding over-
crowding of state courts-do not translate well when imposed on
federal courts. Nevertheless, under Omni Capital the federal
courts must decide where to draw the line between state law limits
and limits imposed only by the Constitution.'9 °
To deal with the problem federal courts could be lenient with
more creative uses of the state long-arm statute. The "transacting
business" clauses of the statutes are especially suited for this. The
commentary to the Uniform Act demonstrates that this clause was
meant to liberalize personal jurisdiction.' 9 ' It would not trample on
state interests to do so-the state has little interest in restricting
federal court jurisdiction in federal question cases. And it does pay
due regard for the state law as required by Rule 4.92
189. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-3(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (antitrust - same
language as the Sherman Antitrust Act); GA. STAT. § 10-1-441 et. seq. (1989) (trademark -
similar to the Lanham Act); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.301 (West 1989) (Securities law - with
language tracking the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
190. With the latter, the federal court is free to make its own decision on limits, unfet-
tered by the limits of state law. ,
191. Comment to Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act § 1.03, 13
U.L.A. 362 (1986) ("This provision should be given the same expansive interpretation that
was intended by the draftsmen of the Illinois Act and has been given by the courts of that
state.").
192. Rule 4 says that the federal court may assert jurisdiction "under the circum-
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All of this may seem simple, but there is a delicate and difficult
balancing act being performed here. On the one hand, it is desira-
ble to accommodate federal interests, particularly in federal ques-
tion cases. On the other hand, a federal court cannot simply re-
write a state statute to fit its needs. Finding the right balance is
not a simple task. The situation cries out for a reasoned Congres-
sional solution. 193
V. CONCLUSION
It is no surprise that courts have not been able to draw clear
lines in jurisdictional analysis. What is surprising is the inability of
courts to draw a line between statutory and constitutional analysis.
As we have seen, a few states (Type 1) have given up the charade
and passed statutes that throw jurisdictional analysis entirely to
the constitution. A few others (Type 3 states) have moved gener-
ally in that direction, while at least pretending to keep their ties to
specific statutory descriptions. Most states (Type 2) have main-
tained a formal tie to categories of jurisdictional acts, while pro-
fessing to stretch those categories as far as the constitution will
allow. But, when pressed, this latter profession proves to be an il-
lusion. These states remain as tied to the wording of the statute as
to the limits of the constitution.
Perhaps this is because it is easier to measure jurisdiction by
reference to these categories. Categories give an alternative to the
uncertainty of constitutional decisionmaking. It lessens the num-
ber of appeals, because state statutory decisions cannot be ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court. And categories are something that
will remain certain, unless the state supreme court or the legisla-
ture changes them. Decisions on due process limits, on the other
hand (particularly those made by state courts), are not subject to
state control and can change as the Supreme Court changes.
Unfortunately the methods used by states to analyze their stat-
utes have some untoward consequences. By proclaiming their stat-
stances" provided in the state law. Since state law does not speak directly to the circum-
stances involved in a federal question case (with the possible exception of South Dakota's
statute) reading the statute more leniently in a case where the state has no analogous law is
not inappropriate. After all, Rule 4 can properly be read to be using state law as federal law,
in much the same way that state statutes of limitations are adopted. But where the circum-
stances anticipated by state law simply do not fit precisely with federal law, the federal
courts ought to be able to interpret the law to fit the circumstances most rationally.
193. The Advisory Committee on Rules has proposed amendments to Rule 4 that
would create a federal amenability standard. F. Supp. Advance Sheets, Oct. 30, 1989, CLIV
at CXC-CXCI.
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utes to be as broad as the constitution allows, while still maintain-
ing fealty to the words of the statute, uncertainty is promoted.
Among interstate actors it becomes difficult to predict when they
may be subject to the courts of any particular forum, even when
the statute seems to be specific. Among scholars it may evoke some
skepticism about the honesty of the courts' decision making. And
in federal courts it creates both confusion and unfairness. The fed-
eral court problem may in the end be the easiest to solve. If Rule 4
is amended to provide a general federal long-arm standard, federal
courts will no longer be bound by the state statutes. But it remains
for the states to decide just how far they really want to reach for
jurisdiction and whether they want to cut the traditional ties to
categories. There is some movement, though halting, in the direc-
tion of loosening the ties. At a minimum, it would be useful if the
states would confront the problem and make a decision one way or
the other.
